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On December 2, 2017, activists protested several Apple stores 
throughout France.1  Members of the French unit of the Association for the 
Taxation of Financial Transactions and Citizen’s Action occupied multiple 
French Apple stores demanding Apple pay its taxes.2 One protester stated 
“Apple must stop denying the tax practices highlighted by the European 
Commission’s investigation, withdraw its appeal to the European Court of 
Justice and pay its fine of 13 billion euros as quickly as possible.”3 
The purpose of this article is to use the Apple Ireland Tax litigation as 
a case study to explore the complexity of power relationships between three 
competing sources of sovereignty: the corporation, the nation-state, and the 
international institution. In order to do this, I will first briefly explore the 
procedural, factual, and legal background of the Apple-Ireland tax litigation 
with the European Commission and then examine the sovereign power 
relationship of the nation-state of Ireland, the multi-national corporation of 
Apple, Inc. and the European Union. The article will explore three possible 
stories of the competition between these three sources of sovereign power: 
first, that corporate sovereignty has replaced nation-state sovereignty as the 
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 1.  Barbara Kollmeyer, Shouting ‘Pay your Taxes’, Activists Occupy Apple Retail Stores Across 
France, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/shouting-pay-your-taxes-
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 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
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most important source of sovereign power in the international regime; 
second, that corporate sovereignty has not overpowered nation-state 
sovereignty; and third, a middle ground approach that suggests the picture is 
much more complex and dynamic than either previous position. Ultimately, 
I will conclude that the third approach is the most accurate and useful 
narrative regarding competition between sovereign powers. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
The procedural history of the Apple-Ireland tax case stretches back a 
few years. A quick overview of relevant facts and legal background that led 
to the case will be helpful in understanding its controversy. This background 
takes only a high-level view of the case. It focuses on the corporate structure 
of Apple in Ireland and the arguments made by the European Commission 
in deciding to hold Ireland accountable for unpaid tax by Apple. 
This dispute traces back to May 21, 2013, when a U.S. Senate 
subcommittee asked Apple to testify about its various tax programs as a part 
of a broader investigation into corporate tax loopholes.4 Within three weeks 
of Apple’s testimony on June 12, 2013, the European Commission 
(“Commission”) sent a letter to Ireland requesting  information on Ireland’s 
tax ruling practice with respect to Apple.5 This letter focused on three Apple 
subsidiaries: Apple Operations International (“AOI”), Apple Sales 
International (“ASI”), and Apple Operations Europe (“AOE”).6 These three 
subsidiaries were also the focus of the Senate subcommittee hearing three 
weeks earlier.7  Ireland replied to the Commission in July, providing the 
requested information.8 On October 21, 2013, the Commission requested that 
Ireland provide the rulings issued by Irish Revenue in 1991 and 2007 that 
gave preferential tax treatment to Apple subsidiaries ASI and AOE, with 
specific focus on the reports of the companies’ tax advisor.9 The Commission 
further requested information on all Apple companies’ tax residents in 
Ireland, including all tax returns of these companies for 2010, 2011, and 
2012.10 
 
 4.  Connie Guglielmo, Apple, Called A U.S. Tax Dodger, Says It’s Paid ‘Every Single Dollar’ of 
Taxes Owed, FORBES (May 21, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2013/05/21/apple-
called-a-tax-dodger-by-senate-committee-apple-says-system-needs-to-be-dramatically-
simplified/#1991747c3384. 
 5.  2017 O.J. (L 187) 1. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Allison Christians, Friends With Tax Benefits: Apple’s Cautionary Tale, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 
1031, 1032 (2015). 
 8.  O.J. (L 187), supra note 5, at 1. 
 9.  Id. at 2. 
 10.  Id. 
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Having received this information, the Commission informed Ireland via 
letter on March 7, 2014 that it was investigating whether the tax rulings 
issued by Irish Revenue in 1991 and 2007 for ASI and AOE constituted new 
state aid.11 On June 11, 2014, the Commission decided to open a formal 
investigation into the 1991 and 2007 tax rulings “on the grounds that those 
rulings could constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the 
Treaty” [the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union].12 This 
formal declaration of investigation is referred to as the “Opening 
Decision.”13 After various back and forth communications between the 
Commission, Ireland, and Apple over the course of the next two years, the 
Commission concluded on August 30, 2016, that Ireland gave undue tax 
benefits of approximately $14 billion USD or €13 billion to the Apple 
subsidiaries operating in Ireland.14 Having not paid the required amount, the 
Commission then referred Ireland to the European Court of Justice on 
October 4, 2017, for failing to recover from Apple illegal state aid as required 
by the Commission’s decision a year previously.15 Currently, Apple and 
Ireland have both appealed the Commission’s decision. 
Like most multi-national corporations, the structure of Apple as a 
corporation is complex. As mentioned above, two Apple subsidiaries, ASI 
and AOE, are the specific focus of the Commission.16 Both are incorporated 
in Ireland, fully owned by the Apple Group, and are ultimately controlled by 
the U.S. parent corporation, Apple, Inc.17 These two subsidiaries mainly use 
Apple’s intellectual property to sell and manufacture Apple products, such 
as iPhones and Mac computers, outside of North and South America.18 ASI 
and AOE primarily sold to the European market.19 ASI and AOE had a “cost-
sharing” agreement with Apple, Inc., where ASI and AOE would make 
yearly payments to the Apple parent corporation in the United States to fund 
research and development costs conducted on behalf of the various Apple 
subsidiaries.20 Each year, ASI and AOE would make the payments back to 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits 
To Apple Worth Up To €13 Billion (Aug. 30, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
2923_en.htm. 
 15. European Commission Press Release IP/17/3702, State Aid: Commission Refers Ireland To 
Court For Failure To Recover Illegal Tax Benefits From Apple Worth Up To €13 Billion (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3702_en.htm.  
 16. European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, supra note 14.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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the parent Apple, Inc., and deduct this expense from their profits.21 Apple set 
up their sales in Europe such that customers were contractually buying 
products from ASI in Ireland rather than the stores that physically sold the 
products to customers, thus creating a situation in which all European sales 
and profits from these sales were directly in Ireland.22 
Ireland and ASI agreed to a method to calculate internal allocation of 
profits starting with the 1991 tax ruling by Irish Revenue with Apple, 
followed by an update in 2007 to the agreement.23 This allocation of profits 
was significant given that all European sales and profits were flowing 
through Ireland and ASI. The agreement entitled a split of profits for tax 
purposes in Ireland, where under the agreed method, most profits were 
allocated to a “head office” of ASI that was not located in any country and 
had no employees or location, while a minority of profits were allocated to 
the Irish branch of ASI.24 Under the Commission’s calculation, ASI recorded 
an effective tax rate of approximately 0.05% in 2011, decreasing to 0.005% 
in 2014.25 This system and structure of tax avoidance was almost identical to 
the other Apple Ireland subsidiary, AOE.26 
The issue at the center of this tax agreement between Apple and Ireland 
is whether such an agreement constituted “state aid.” State aid is described 
in Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) as “any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so 
far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
internal market.”27 
Built within this article is the “arm’s length principle.” In order to 
determine if state aid has been granted to a private corporation, it is necessary 
for the Commission to compare the agreement of tax allocation between 
Ireland and Apple to an “ordinary tax system, based on the difference 
between profits and losses of an undertaking carry its activities under normal 
market conditions.”28 The normal market conditions are calculated by 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, supra note 14. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. For example, in 2011, SASI had recorded profits of approximately €16 billion, but under 
the Irish Revenue rulings, only had a taxable base of €50 million, thus leaving €15.95 billion in profits 
untaxed. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 28.  European Commission State Aid Ireland 2014/C 369/04, 2014 O.J. (C 369) 32.  
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looking at transfer pricing established at an arm’s length.29 Here, the taxable 
base was less than the tax system would calculate from the correct 
implementation of the arm’s length principle, thus providing a select 
advantage to the Apple subsidiaries.30 Further, the method used by Irish 
Revenue to internally allocate profits within ASI and AOE gave an undue 
advantage under the state aid rules of Article 107.31 According to the 
Commission, this internal allocation of profits had “no factual or economic 
justification.”32 Having reached the conclusion that Ireland was giving 
improper state aid to Apple through their subsidiaries ASI and AOE, the 
Commission set out to calculate the value of the undue competitive 
advantage Ireland gave to Apple.33 Ultimately, the Commission calculated 
€13 billion ($14 billion USD) in unpaid tax that Ireland must recover from 
Apple.34 
Since this ruling, Ireland has yet to recover the unpaid tax from Apple. 
On October 4, 2017, the Commission referred Ireland to the European Court 
of Justice for failing to recover the illegal tax benefits from Apple.35 Ireland 
had four months after the decision was reached on August 30, 2016 to 
recover the unpaid tax and failed to do so.36 Instead of recovering the unpaid 
tax, Ireland has appealed the Commission’s August 2016 decision to the 
European Court of Justice.37 Apple has also appealed the decision, arguing 
that the European Court of Justice should annul the decision of the 
Commission from August 30, 2016.38 In its appeal, Apple argues fourteen 
points of law against the Commission in the Commission’s decision to hold 
Ireland accountable for a violation of Article 107(1) of the TFEU on 
improper state aid grounds.39 The case is still ongoing. 
II. SOVEREIGNTY 
The Apple-Ireland tax case helps elucidate two interesting relations 
between different types of sovereign power-holders. First, the nation-state 
sovereign relationship to an international institution and its legal framework. 
 
 29.  Id. at 33.  
 30.  Id. 
 31.  European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, supra note 14. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  European Commission Press Release IP/17/3702, supra note 15. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Case T–892/16, Apple Sales Int’l & Apple Operations Eur. v. Comm’n, 2017 O.J. (C 53) 37–
39 (pending case). 
 39.  Id. 
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Second, the relationship between sovereign nation-state and multi-national 
corporation, which has its own version of sovereign power. In order to 
explore these relationships, this section is broken down into four sub-
sections. The first will briefly look at some of the arguments the nation-state 
of Ireland has made with respect to its own sovereignty to govern its internal 
tax law even though it is also part of the E.U. legal regime. After exploring 
this relationship, the following three sub-sections explore the relationship 
between the sovereign nation-state of Ireland to the multi-national 
corporation of Apple, which also has its own form of sovereignty. In these 
three sub-sections, I will draw on the framework spelled out by Stephen 
Cohen in order to tell three different stories of the sovereign relationships 
between Apple, Ireland, and the E.U.40 First, Apple’s corporate sovereignty 
overpowers Ireland’s state sovereignty; second, Apple’s corporate 
sovereignty does not overpower Ireland’s state sovereignty; and third, that 
neither of these positions is correct.  Ultimately, this section aims to use the 
Apple-Ireland tax case as a tool to explore arguments posited by this larger 
framework. 
A. Irish State Sovereignty 
The first question of sovereign power arises in the relationship between 
Ireland and the E.U. Ireland has its own sovereign power as a nation-state, 
but is also a member of the larger institutional and legal regime of the E.U..  
As a member-state of the E.U., Ireland has agreed to a relationship of 
diminished sovereignty in some respects to achieve goals only available by 
ceding some authority to another institution. The question of the balance of 
sovereign power in this particular case is whether Ireland has ceded ultimate 
tax authority to the E.U. This begs the question: what does sovereignty 
actually mean? Sovereignty itself is a notoriously difficult term to define, but 
one commonly accepted definition is that sovereignty has two dimensions: 
internal and external sovereignty.41 It might be said a State is “internally 
sovereign if it enjoys a monopoly as the ultimate authority regulating a range 
of social activities, including economic policies, within its country’s 
borders.”42 
There are two distinct arguments that Ireland has internal sovereignty 
over its tax policy, and has not ceded ultimate tax authority to the E.U..  First, 
Ireland should have control over its own corporate tax policy because it has 
 
 40.  STEPHEN D. COHEN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: 
AVOIDING SIMPLICITY, EMBRACING COMPLEXITY 234 (2007). 
 41.  Id. at 235. 
 42.  Id. 
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ultimate internal sovereign power.43 Second, the Commission is impinging 
on Irish sovereignty by amending Irish rules or policies on a retrospective 
basis.44 Each of these arguments has been made by Irish officials45 as well as 
outside administrators.46 For example, former E.U. Competition 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes has argued that state-aid rules should not apply 
to tax matters.47 “EU member states have a sovereign right to determine their 
own tax laws.”48 As a former commissioner, Ms. Kroes once led the 
Commission and is an authority on its operation. Ms. Kroes also points out 
that the Commission was using the state aid argument to rewrite the rules 
governing member states control over their own tax laws.49 
The first argument Ms. Kroes makes is a classic internal sovereign 
argument that Ireland should have total control over its own internal tax 
policy. Under this view the dispute fits neatly within the definition of internal 
sovereignty because tax decisions are economic policies in a specific area. 
By this argument, while Ireland has ceded some sovereign power over 
economic decisions to the E.U., decisions over internal tax laws were not a 
power ceded to the E.U.. The second view articulated by Ms. Kroes that the 
Commission is using the state aid argument to reach back and rewrite internal 
member-state’s tax laws can be articulated as the “retroactivity argument.” 
This argument illuminates the concern that the E.U. is attempting to take 
sovereignty away from member-states such as Ireland after the fact. Ms. 
Kroes acknowledges that it is a fundamental principle of tax law (within the 
E.U.) that changes do not apply retroactively.50 Such a retroactive change 
“would be fundamentally unfair and would harm competition, growth and 
tax . . . [a]nd it raises serious questions about legal certainty and the rule of 
law.”51 Yet, the Commission is continuing to pursue this argument in the 
ongoing litigation. Further, by imposing aggressive enforcement of state aid 
on Ireland, the E.U. is fundamentally shifting the power to make decisions 
of internal tax policy away from the Irish state. 
 
 43.  JOE BRENNAN, Getting to the Core of Europe’s Case Against Apple and Ireland, IRISH TIMES 
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/getting-to-the-core-of-europe-s-case-
against-apple-and-ireland-1.2960870. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Juliette Garside, Apple Tax Ruling is Unfair, Says Former European Commissioner, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/01/apple-tax-ruling-fundamentally-
unfair-former-ec-competition-chief. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
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These two arguments are a snapshot into the broader arguments that 
former E.U. officials, Irish officials, and others are making with respect to 
Ireland’s sovereign power to write its own internal tax laws. There is a 
complex dynamic of sovereignty between Ireland and the E.U., in which the 
state has ceded some, but not all, internal decision-making power to a larger 
institution. The concern over the attempted shift in sovereignty made by the 
E.U. has not only caused this specific litigation on Ireland’s tax dealings with 
Apple, but has also caused other States to take positions on this power 
struggle. For example, Luxembourg has decided to stand with Ireland against 
this attempted sovereign power shift because the Commission is subjecting 
Luxembourg to litigation involving preferential tax treatment to other multi-
national corporations,52 while Poland has taken a stand against Ireland.53 
B. Apple Sovereignty Did Influence Ireland 
While Ireland and the E.U. are engaging questions of internal state 
sovereignty over tax decisions, another question is raised regarding Apple’s 
role. Specifically, in what ways did Apple, as a multi-national corporation 
with its own source of power, act as a sovereign towards Ireland and the 
E.U.? This section explores the argument that Apple, as a corporation with 
its own version of sovereign power, had the upper-hand in influencing 
Ireland and led to their tax deal. 
A corporation does not have the traditional sovereignty of a state, but a 
corporation can wield sovereign power both within a state and 
internationally. One broad definition of sovereignty laid out by Stephen D. 
Krasner explains that sovereignty exhibits four distinct characteristics: 
1. Ability to control activities within and across a country’s borders, 
including the movement of goods, capital, and people; 
2. Possession of clear title to ultimate political authority within the 
state; 
3. Ultimate arbiter of internal behavior, independent of any external 
authority; and 
4. Formal diplomatic recognition by other nation-states that a 
government is able and entitled to exercise sovereign control of its 
territory.54 
 
 52.  See Joe Brennan, Luxembourg to support Irish Appeal over Apple tax ruling, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 
28, 2017, 5:34 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/luxembourg-to-support-irish-
appeal-over-apple-tax-ruling-1.3026878. 
 53.  See Jack Power, Poland will line up against Ireland Apple tax appeal, IRISH TIMES (Dec. 5, 
2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/poland-will-line-up-against-ireland-in-
apple-tax-appeal-1.3315417.  
 54.  COHEN, supra note 39, at 235. 
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It is not necessary, however, for a state to simultaneously meet all four points 
to claim sovereignty.55 Thus, if one applies these four characteristics to any 
modern multi-national corporation, it is evident that corporations share some 
of these characteristics of sovereignty – specifically the first and third. While 
the comparison is not necessarily clean or straightforward in every sense, a 
large multi-national corporation such as Apple has extensive control of their 
own activities within a state and has further extensive control of internal 
behavior. It is important to note that corporations do not necessarily have 
these sovereign characteristics with the same strength as a state sovereign. 
This is true because a state sovereign imposes a legal framework onto the 
corporation in that state’s jurisdiction. Even so, multinational corporations 
arguably do hold some level of what could be called ‘sovereign power’. 
Given that multi-national corporations such as Apple share certain 
sovereign traits with states, the next step is to evaluate how a corporation can 
express some version of sovereign power to state sovereigns. The argument 
is that because of the rising market power of multi-national corporations, 
corporations are equal, if not greater, determinants of the economic destinies 
of nation-states than state governments.56 In the case of Apple, the 
corporation’s huge global wealth and market power might motivate a state 
to change its internal economic policies to capture some value from having 
Apple reside (at least in some way) in its jurisdiction. In this case, it was 
Apple negotiating with Ireland to find a tax regime that would be beneficial 
to both Apple and Ireland. 
The position explored here is that, as a multi-national corporation, 
Apple diminished the power and role of the nation-state of Ireland. The 
Ireland tax decisions in 1991 support this assertion. These rulings, as detailed 
in Section 1, clearly point to a deal that was so extremely favorable to Apple 
as to funnel all European profits through the Apple subsidiaries in Ireland.57 
The likely story is that Apple and Ireland negotiated for this extremely 
preferential tax treatment for Apple in return for some tax revenue and job 
creation within the state.58 Apple, as a corporate sovereign with control over 
where it wants to have jurisdictional presence, conceivably had other choices 
regarding where to place these subsidiaries. This power of choice created a 
relationship of significant power for Apple over the available states who 
were willing to listen and negotiate, as Apple would bring tax revenue and 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 236. 
 57.  European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, supra note 14. 
 58.  See Gaspard Sebag, et al., The Inside Story of Apple’s $14 Billion Tax Bill, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
16, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/the-inside-story-of-apple-s-14-billion-
tax-bill (noting that Apple has created 6,000 jobs in Ireland). 
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jobs. This story shows the strong incentive Apple might have been able to 
use as leverage to get this particular set of tax rulings that were so preferential 
to their bottom line. If one views this as the correct narrative, it seems clear 
that Apple had the upper hand in making decisions on territorial location for 
its subsidiaries with Ireland because it had the option to relocate elsewhere. 
Another example that could be used to argue that Apple has 
increasingly stronger sovereign power to wield in the international realm is 
Apple’s decision to appeal the August 2016 Commission decision as a 
separate party from Ireland.59 This appeal might be evidence that Apple is 
engaging in activities that may been seen as traditionally reserved for 
governments.60 In both examples, it does not seem unreasonable to argue that 
multi-national corporations are getting the upper hand in their relationships 
with sovereign states with respect to certain decisions that were ordinarily 
reserved for a state’s sovereign power. 
C. Apple Sovereignty Did Not Influence Ireland 
An alternative to the narrative proposed above is that Apple did not 
wield sovereign power to influence Ireland. This view rests on a territorial 
understanding of sovereignty. It can be argued that “[e]ven the most 
ineffectual government has the unequivocal authority to physically block the 
entrance of a foreign subsidiary that is not welcomed.”61 This is evident in 
the Apple-Ireland tax case in the fact that Ireland could have chosen not to 
give Apple preferential tax treatment in the ways that it did. If Apple wanted 
a physical presence in Ireland, Ireland had discretion to allow or disallow 
ASI and AOE to incorporate as Irish corporations. This legal fact marks the 
upper-hand state sovereigns inherently have when dealing with corporations 
precisely because corporations are reliant on states for territorial access to 
their borders. But it is not only the physical entry that states can control with 
regard to corporate access. States can use other legal controls once the 
corporation resides in the state. For example, a government can force a 
subsidiary to leave or modify its actions by tightening regulatory controls, 
increasing costs of business, or subjecting executives to criminal law 
violations, amongst other things.62 If the corporation does not want to play 
by the state’s rules, it can leave. 
Applying this to the Apple Ireland tax case, one may argue Apple was 
really beholden to Ireland. Specifically, Ireland could have prevented Apple 
 
 59.  Case T–892/16, Apple Sales Int’l & Apple Operations Eur. v. Comm’n, 2017 O.J. (C 53) 37–
39 (pending case). 
 60.  See e.g. COHEN, supra note 39, at 238. 
 61.  Id. at 240. 
 62.  Id. at 241. 
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from setting up shop in the first place, or required Apple to play by the same 
tax rules as other corporations. By deciding to give Apple a great financial 
incentive to move some operations to Ireland, Ireland used its own power to 
make an offer in order to best provide extra revenue and jobs for its citizens. 
Stated another way, Ireland decided to express its sovereign power in 
determining how Apple may access Ireland’s territory and in what ways. 
Apple had a role in choosing and working with Ireland to come to an 
agreement, but Ireland had the final say in this arrangement. Thus, one could 
tell a story that in granting a deal to Apple, Ireland did not erode its state 
sovereignty, but rather reclaimed it.63 
D. It Is More Complicated 
Ultimately, the two positions expressed in the previous sub-sections do 
not express the whole, complicated story. While both Apple and Ireland have 
engaged in certain tax treatment preferential for Apple, it has neither 
completely eroded nor extended the relationship of power and sovereignty 
between a corporation and nation-state such that there is a clear winner or 
loser. Instead, this case provides us with an example of the economic reality 
of a global, interdependent business environment filled with corporations 
wielding more power than before, but still beholden to states in certain ways, 
such as territorial access. There are myriad reasons that can be raised to show 
that this story is more complicated than the story of either side getting the 
upper hand directly, but I will focus on two particular players that increase 
the complexity of the story: transnational actors and the European Union. 
Transnational actors can be defined as “groups, businesses, coalitions, 
organizations . . . that are active in multiple countries and operate 
independently of any government.”64 These actors have come to exist 
because of the technological and communications advantages that have 
encouraged international activities while reducing operating costs.65 It is not 
only the nation-state and the multi-national corporation vying for power 
amongst themselves, but also transnational actors bringing a plurality of 
voices and views into the discussion. These transnational actors have played 
a significant role in international law and public policy. One part of the 
Apple-Ireland story that has not been explored is the extent to which 
transnational actors played a role in the initial 1991 and subsequent 2007 
Irish Revenue decisions. One can easily imagine the political coalitions 
within the Irish government or business groups who might gain increased 
 
 63.  Id. at 242. 
 64.  Id. at 244–45. 
 65.  Id. at 245. 
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business from a local Apple presence petitioning the government both 
directly and indirectly for a deal to be made. These transnational actors likely 
played a strong role, at least internally within Ireland, in helping lead to the 
agreement between Apple and Ireland. A story of corporate and state 
sovereignty jockeying for position with each other leaves out the story of the 
jockeys, which must include transnational actors. 
The most significant part of the story that is unaccounted for in either 
previous position presented above is the role played by the E.U. itself. 
Ireland made certain choices to cede or not cede sovereignty to the E.U. for 
various goals such as economic efficiency. In order to tell a full story of 
Apple and Ireland reaching a preferential tax agreement, some commentary 
is required regarding the role of E.U. law. Apple was not only reaching an 
agreement with Ireland, but also with E.U. law applicable to Ireland as a 
member-state. To state this proposition as a question, what role did 
navigating E.U. law play in the two agreements made between Apple and 
Ireland? An accounting of this would help alleviate some of the confusion of 
this litigation. At the heart of this story is the power struggle of sovereign 
power between Ireland and the E.U., and having a clear commentary of the 
role of E.U. law would only help illuminate and clarify the parties power 
relationships between each other. If one wants to therefore tell a full story of 
the sovereign power shifting between parties, one needs to tell a more 
complete story of the role of E.U. law in the two agreements between Apple 
and Ireland. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The story of Apple and Ireland’s decision to reach a preferential tax 
agreement has caused both legal and public relations headaches for both. It 
is clear that this is not a purely legal dispute. Lying underneath the legal 
dispute is a complicated mix of sovereign power sharing and taking. Apple 
and Ireland engaged in a form of power sharing, between a corporate 
sovereign and a state sovereign. Yet the state has voluntarily given away 
certain sovereign power to a larger institution, the E.U. These three parties 
are engaged in creating and changing relationships in order that each might 
claim some benefit. For Ireland, more tax revenue and jobs created within 
the state. For Apple, a low tax jurisdiction to avoid high E.U. taxes. For the 
E.U., to claw back some tax revenue and potentially some sovereign power 
away from Ireland. It is this underlying dynamic that can be told as three 
different stories about the sovereign power relationship. What this litigation 
brings to bear is a clearer lens through which to view the sovereign power 
relationships between three distinct sovereigns. Ultimately, this article has 
only told part of the story about the sovereign relationships between Apple, 
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Ireland, and the E.U.. The article aims merely to frame the issue, with the 
hope that it leads to more in-depth analysis of the relationships and the 
struggles of various types of sovereign powers in the Apple Ireland case and 
others like it. 
 
